ATTACHMENT 17 – *WRITTEN STATEMENT OF MST2 PETER ANDERSON*

Statement regarding the M/V COSCO BUSAN Allison with the Bay Bridge November 7, 2007:

On November 7, 2007, 0830 received a call from the Sector San Francisco Command Center, and was briefed that the M/V COSCO BUSAN collided with the west span of the bay bridge and is currently sheening. Incident Management Division dispatched a response team consisting of MST3 Mike Eaton, and Myself MST2 Peter G. Anderson. 0910 Arrived at the bay bridge aboard Station San Francisco 41', and I instructed PO Eaton to begin documenting the incident by taking pictures. I observed superficial damage to piling, oil splashed on the corner of concrete piling, and a trail of black oil starting at the bridge going north. The oil trail consisted of thick black product, was an estimated 3-4 feet wide, and fairly consistent. We followed the trail from the bay bridge west of Yerba Buena Island to where M/V COSCO BUSAN was anchored at anchorage no.7. I briefed the CC/IMD of the observed spill amount. 0930 as we came along side of the vessel, we observed a large gash on the port side. Estimated gash dimensions: Starting about 20ft forward of the midline it was about 80-100ft long, starting about 10ft above the waterline the gash was about 10ft in height. During initial survey, I notice a small stream of oil actively flowing from the gash near the midline. At 0935 I noticed the stream of leaking oil turn to a seep, and within five minutes after that stop leaking altogether. After relaying our findings to the Command Center and IMD, we received authorization and boarded the vessel at 1000.

First action was to interview the Chief Engineer; the Chief Engineer stated that they did not know if both the no.3 and no.4 tank had been punctured or which one individually. I questioned the chief trying to find out what the total capacities of the ruptured tanks were, what the different products were, and how much was missing. After having difficulties getting this information I asked to see the oil record book and noted that before the allision tank level of no.4 was 742.5 MT of RMG 380, no.3 was 80.4 MT of MF 380. The Chief Engineer stated that tank levels of No.4 had 550 MT they had transferred approximately 192 MT, and No.3 had 50MT they had transferred approximately 30 MT, and that the ship was pumping these tanks into the double bottom HFO bunker tanks. The Chief Engineer was getting these figures from gauge readings. I asked the Chief Engineer to get a sounding on each of the three tanks. PO Eaton and I were able to agree upon that the rupture was most likely contained to the No.3 tank. We came to this conclusion by looking at the ships diagrams and the placement of the tank as compared to the leak, and the level of product in each of the tanks. If the No.4 tank had been ruptured then its 550 MT would put its level above the rupture line and it would still be leaking. The Chief Engineer came back stating that the sounding tubes were bent and could not take accurate readings. 1030 I briefed CC/IMD of these numbers, the total capacity of each of these tanks is 879.2MT, and that the most likely source of discharge was the No.3 tank and the only net loss we could see was the .4 MT but that these figures were rough because the sounding tubes were bent. Because I was not getting very far with the Chief Engineer I suggested they should get a spill estimate based off the

description of 3-4 feet wide, 2 miles long, and thick black product. I asked the chief Engineer to show us the tank gauges; the gauges were increments of 10 MT and there were no hash marks so it was difficult to get an accurate reading. When I asked the Chief Engineer what gauges were for the No.3, No.4, and Double Bottom tanks but because of language barrier he could only identify the No.3 tank which read about 50MT. We tried to discern the gauges ourselves but were unable to because of Chinese writing and duplicated numbers. At 1035 I asked the Chief Engineer to try sounding the tanks again, and left PO Eaton in the ships office to await the results of the soundings while I interviewed the Captain.

I interviewed the Captain of the M/V COSCO BUSAN, ensured that they had contacted there Agent/OSRO to begin containment and cleanup. He assured me that he had done so and I took down the contact information of his agent and OSRO for verification. 1045 I issued a Notice of Federal Interest to the Captain and returned to the ships office to continue trying to ascertain the spill amount. I Contacted the ships agent with Norton Lilly, and was assured that their OSRO was dispatching assets. I told the Chief Engineer that we needed to try to sound the tanks again, and that I needed to take samples of the tanks. The Chief Engineer stated that we could not take samples until the transfer was complete. In addition, the Chief Engineer said they were transferring at approximately 6 MT and hour and it would be some time before transfer would be complete. I could tell that the Chief Engineer was starting to get flustered, and was working many other problems. In working with the Chief Engineer, although he was cooperative we had a severe language barrier, at times we resorted to using hand gestures and pictograms in the effort to obtain information, it was difficult to obtain information beyond basic questions. 1105 CDR Achinbach and IO team boarded, I briefed them on the current situation, and that I had not conducted drug or alcohol testing. The IO team left to go to the bridge, shortly after that they radioed for the Chief Engineer to report to the bridge for investigation and drug and alcohol testing. 1110 I briefed the USCGC Tern of the new POB, they informed me that the Pilot was disembarking and if that was ok. I informed the USCGC Tern that this Pilot was the relief and was not involved in the incident so he was clear to leave. 1125 I received word from the Command Center that a Fish and Game quantification team was coming and that I should return to base. 1130 IMD team disembarked the M/V COSCO BUSAN. 1200 I took a sample of oil ½ NM North West of western span of the bay bridge. 1210 arrived at Sta San Francisco, briefed Fish and Game of current situation, and the current difficulties I had trying to ascertain the spill amount. This information is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge.

13 NOV 2007

Peter G. Anderson, MST2 USCG
Incident Management Division
Sector San Francisco